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Smith: The Revised Divorce Law of West Virginia

THE REVISED DIVORCE LAW OF WEST VIRGINIA
Divorce by judicial decree had its origin in the ecclesiastical
law of England. The abolition of the common law ecclesiastical
system in this country' called for some new scheme of granting
"legal separation" to-the parties. Some jurisdictions turned to
legislative divorces, but this was found to be highly impractical.2
In West Virginia divorce has always been governed by statute,d
which is regarded as amendatory neither of the common law nor
the ecclesiastical law, but a full and complete disposition of the
subject.4

I
Recent legislation' has materially altered the divorce law of
this jurisdiction. The provisions revised are concerned with the
type of divorce, the grounds therefor and the restrictions on remarriage. Various other sections of the divorce law have been
altered, 6 as an incident to the major revisions, simply for clarity.
The ancient divorce a mensa et thoro has been abolished. This
divorce seems to have been well established, not only in this but in
other states. In Virginia, 7 the District of Columbia8 and Maryland' the divorce from bed and board still exists as a separate
institution from a divorce from the bond of matrimony and procurable on different grounds. In most states, however, the distinction between the two is wholly dispensed with and, in some,
though the divorce from bed and board is retained, it is used
largely in lieu of a suit for separate maintenance.10
West Virginia has a statute that provides for separate maintenance"' which is available although no divorce is pending. In
view of this statute and the fact that many evils have resulted from
the continuation of the divorce from bed and board, the West VirI See opinion of Chancellor Tucker in Selden v. Overseers of the poor of
Loudon, 11 Leigh 127 (Va. 1849).
2 See W. VA. CorsT. art. 6, § 39, prohibiting legislative divorces.
3 W. VA. CODs (1868) c. 64.
4 Boger v. Boger, 86 W. Va. 591, 593, 104 S. E. 49 (1920).
O S. B. No. 47, Reg. Sess. 1935.
0W. VA. REv. CODE (1931) c. 48, art. 2, § 15, 18, 19 and 29.
7W.
VA. CODE ANN. (Mfichie, 1930) c. 205, §§ 5103-5104.
8 A. C. CODE (1924) c. 22, § 966.
9 MD. CODE ANN. (Bagby, 1924))§§ 38-39.
10 PA. STAT. (West, 1920) §§ 9154-9155, (Supp. 1928) § 9140; Owro GEN.
CODE ANN. (Page, 1926) § 11979; Ky.STAT. (Carroll, 1930) § 2117.
e. 48, art. 2, § 29.
Il W. VA. REV. CODE (1931)
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ginia Bar Association adopted a report recommending the abolition
12
of bed and board divorces
In Boger v. Boger, 3 the court decided that unless the injured
party after acquiring a divorce from bed and board desired a
divorce from the bond of matrimony, the guilty party was without remedy. This meant that an injured party could wilfully bar
"the guilty spouse from remarriage. Every ground for a divorce
from the bond of matrimony could, moreover, at the option of the
injured party, be used to obtain a divorce from bed and board.1 4
The situation was aggravated by the recognition, of a divorce from
the bond of matrimony obtained by the guilty party in another
jurisdiction,"5 which devitalized the Boger decision where the guilty
litigant was financially able to secure the foreign decree. In
short, this condition was considered the major defect in the old
i
law. o
Another objection to bed and board divorces was rested upon
illegal marriages with third parties after a decree. This was confined, however, to a class of litigants which misunderstood the
effect of he divorce."
II
The abolition of the divorce from bed and board necessitated
a restatement and revision of the grounds for divorce. Adultery
and conviction of felony after marriage as grounds for a divorce
from the bond of matrimony remain unaltered. Formerly a
divorce from bed and board could be obtained on the ground of
desertion without reference to the period of the desertion, %rhine
the statute required a fixed period of three years as ground for a
divorce from the bond of matrimony. The present law simply
reduces this period from three to two years. The other grounds
for a divorce from bed and board, namely, cruel treatment, habitual
drunkenness and addiction to use of drugs, have been made
grounds for a permanent divorce.
12 Report of Committee on Judicial Administration and Legal Reform,
W. VA. BA Ass'N Rusp. (1934) 104-114.
isBoger v. Boger, supra n. 4.
1W. VA. REv. CODE (1931) c. 48, art. 2,

§

35.

Campbell v. Switzer, 74 W. Va. 509, 82 S. E. 319 (1914).
1 For an excellent discussion of the problem see Riley, Divorco Under the
1981 Code, W. VA. BAR AS'N REP. (1932) p. 39, 48.
17 For other objections to the continuation of the divorce from bed and
board, see report to Bar Ass'n supra n. 12.
15
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As the grounds of adultery and conviction of felony remain
unchanged, no subsequent interpretation of the decisions thereunder will be required. To the extent that grounds for a divorce
from bed and board have been made grounds for a divorce from
the bond of matrimony, the courts may be expected to re-examine
the decisions thereunder and require a high degree of proof to permit recovery."'
The ground of desertion has been dealt with in numerous
decisions. In Horkheimer v. Horkheimer"9 desertion is defined
as the voluntary separation withoilt justification of one spouse
from the other with intent to terminate the marriage relation. To
warrant an absolute divorce the desertion must be continuous;20
two independent periods of desertion cannot be combined to meet
the statutory requirement.2
22
that there might be deThe court held in Perine v. Perine
sertion even though the parties remain in the same house, provided
they maintain separate rooms and all marital relations cease. Other
aspects of the subject, such as the degree of wilfulness 23 and the
justification for the desertion," will doubtless require reexamination by the courts.
Though desertion has always been a ground for an absolute
divorce the other grounds under the new statute were formerly
simply the basis for bed and board decrees. Decisions in cases
involving those grounds were, doubtless, influenced by the fact
that the divorce was not absolute 25 and the parties could have
another day in court.
The ground of cruelty may be divided into three classes: (1)
cruel or inhuman treatment, (2) reasonable apprehension of bodily
hurt, and (3) a false charge of prostitution made by the husband
18 For example, the ground of desertion for an absolute divorce is for a
less period than that in adjacent states, except Kentucky and Pennsylvania.
See notes 7, 9 and 10, .supra.
10 106 W. Va. 634, 146 S. E. 614 (1929).
20 Vickers v. Vickers, 95 W. Va. 322, 122 S. E. 279 (1923).
21 Burk v. Burk, 21 W. Va. 445, 453 (1923). •
22W. Va. 530, 146 S. E. 871 (1922); Croll v. Croll, 106 W. Va. 691,
146 S. E. 880 (1929).
233orkheimer v. Horkheimer, supra n. 19.
2-fDawkins v. Dawkins, 72 W. Va. 789, 792, 79 S. E. 822 (1913); Perine
v. Perine, supra n. 22.
25 While a divorce from bed and board is not absolute, it operates upon
the rights and legal capacities of the parties the same as a divorce from
the bond of matrimony. W. VA. RE. CODE (1931) c. 48, art. 2, § 16; and
see revisers' note thereto.
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against the wife. In Maxwel v. Maxwel 20 the test of cruel or inhuman treatment was stated to be whether under all the facts
proven, the plaintiff could with safety to person and health continue to live with the defendant; while in a later case 27 the court
goes further and requires evidence of personal violence. To state
2
the matter plainly, however, as indicated in White v. White, cruel
and inhuman treatment is, like negligence, a relative term, which
takes meaning in application to the circumstances of each particular case.
There must be deliberate and malignant threats by one spouse
to inflict serious bodily harm and the other must fear execution
of the threats to entitle the latter to a divorce for reasonable apprehension of bodily hurt.20 Actual physical violence is, of course, a
sufficient cause.3 0 The court permitted a revival of condoned acts
of cruelty, if such acts were subsequently repeated, in D eusenberry
v. Deusenberry3' and an analogous application could be made in
the case of subsequent threats.
A false charge of prostitution made by a husband against his
wife as a ground for an absolute divorce, may well be regarded
narrowly by the courts. It might prove a facile collusive device
for people of unrefined sensibilities. In Schutte v. Schutte32 a
charge of adultery was not deemed sufficient.3 3 A husband cannot
obtain a divorce on a charge of adultery made against him by his
wife.3" In Dayton v. Dayton," however, the court granted a divorce from bed and board to the wife on an accusation that she
was out in the woods at night for immoral purposes. The husband
admitted that his accusation was based solely on suspicion and on
trial the wife proved its falsity. This decision should be confined
26 69 W. Va. 414, 71 S. E. 571 (1911).

Smailes v. Smailes, 171 S. E. 885 (W. Va. 1933).
-8106 W. Va. 680, 686, 146 S. E. 720 (1929).
29 Lord v. Lord, 80 W. Va. 547, 92 S. E. 749 (1917).
The courts have been
3o Rice v. Rice, 88 W. Va. 54, 106 S. E. 237 (1921).
lenient as to the amount of physical. violence necessary to obtain a bed and
board divorce; since, however, such cause is now a ground for a permanent
divorce the courts will undoubtedly require a greater amount of physical
violence.
3182 W. Va. 135, 95 S. E. 665 (1918).
z;2The court distinguishes between adultery and prostitution. 90 W. Va.
787, 793, 111 S. E. 850 (1922).
33 Boos v. Boos, 93 W. Va. 727, 117 S. E. 616 (1923).
34Roush v. Roush, 90 W. Va. 419, 111 S. E. 334 (1922).
3s 107 W. Va. 299, 148 S. E. 118 (1929).
2T
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to its facts; an absolute divorce should not, it is believed, be granted
on such evidence alone. The ground can generally, however, be
restricted by requiring that the charge of prostitution be made
not only to the wife but to others and by demanding strict proof
of the accusation.
Habitual drunkenness after marriage has not been a common
ground for a divorce in this jurisdiction. In only one case, Mann
v. Mann,36 has the statute been applied and there the court implied
obiter that if the party seeking the divorce had contributed to the
37
formation of the habit, the divorce would not have been granted.
It has been held that drunkenness, not habitual, does not excuse
cruelty which is cause for a divorce. 8 In some jurisdictions the
period of habitual drunkenness establishing the right to divorce is
fixed by statute.39
The addiction of either party, after marriage, to use of opium,
cocaine or other like drugs as a ground for divorce is of recent
origin in this jurisdiction.40 This personal fault is as serious a
basis for divorce as habitual drunkenness but legal recognition of
the fact was left by the courts to the legislatures.4 ' The West Virginia enactment will require judicial interpretation. What constitutes addiction to drugs is a bariable matter. Ejusdem generis
may be deemed to restrict "other like drugs" to narcotics.
IV
The restrictions on remarriage have been liberalized. Under
the former statute neither party could remarry for six months, the
court at its discretion could impose a greater restriction on the
guilty party and in adultery a five year restriction was imposed
by statute on that party. The statute now provides that neither
3 96 W. Va. 442, 123 S.E. 394 (1924).

there was any domestic cause which contributed to the formation
37 "If
of the habit and for which the wife was chargeable it does not appear in
the record and there is no suggestion that she was the cause."2 Mann v.
Mann, supra n. 36, at 446.
3s Maxwell v. Maxwell, sulra n. 26, at 417.
39 See Kentucky statute requiring at least one year of habitual drunkeness
and the Ohio statute requiring three years, sapra n. 10.
40 This ground was added by the revisers in 1931, W. VA. RET. CODE
(1931) c. 48, art 2, § 6. It has not been considered by the Supreme Court
of Appeals.
41 See, refusing to grant a divorce on ground of cruelty where sole evidence
was habitual use of drugs by the defendant Smith v. Smith, 7 Boyce 283,
(Del. Super. 1919); Ring v. Ring, 118 Ga. 183, 44 S. E. 861 (1903). The
ground of habitual drunkenness does not embrace habitual use of drugs.
Haynes v. Haynes, 86 Fla. 350, 98 So. 66 (1919).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1935

5

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 4 [1935], Art. 8
STUDENT NOTES
party shall remarry, anyone other than the former spouse, within
42
sixty days, or pending appeal of the case in the supreme court.
The court is granted discretion to prohibit the guilty party from
remarrying within not exceeding one year from the date of the
decree. The report to the Bar Association43 pointed out certain
flaws in the old restrictions, namely, that they were binding only
on a defendant on whom personal service was obtained; that the
guilty party could remarry in another jurisdiction, but if he returned he was guilty of bigamy and the issue of that marriage
probably illegitimate; that the guilty party wquld perhaps live in
adultery for five years if he did not remarry; and, that the restrictions were frequently misunderstood by the litigants. This
report, which was adopted, approved a restriction confined simply
to the term of court in which the divorce was obtained.
The present statute though not as liberal as the report, is an
adoption of the policy reflected therein. Since the public is vitally
concerned in the institution of marriage, the problem of restrictions
on remarriage after divorce is merely one of legislative policy.
Neighboring jurisdictions have not generally placed restrictions on
such remarriages. 4 While the policy was at one time toward restrictions in this jurisdiction," a contrary policy is now reflected
in the revised statute.4
V
While numerous minor revisions are made in the divorce law,
most of these were rendered necessary to clarify and conform these
sections to the major amendments. It should be noticed, however,
that the statutory method of maturing such suits has been dispensed with and such suits will now mature as other chancery
causes. The provision requiring the divorce commissioner to have
a thirty day notice before trial is still in force.
42A subsequent remarriage would be void where the supreme court afterwards reversed the former divorce decree. See Note (1921) 7 VA. L. RE.
(N. S.) 92, 94.
4 See report to Bar Ass'n, &upran. 12, at 105.

44 Only Virginia and Pennsylvania have restrictions.

Virginia places a

six months prohibition on both parties, VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1930)
§ 5113. Pennsylvania prohibits the guilty party, from marriage with the
corespondent where the ground is adultery so long as the former spouse is
living. PA. STAT. (West, 1920) § 9191.
-5 See Hall v. Baylous, 109 W. Va. 1, 6, 153 S. E. 293 (1930), setting out

the argument advanced in favor of restrictions on remarriage.
46 The report of the Bar Ass'n, supra n. 12, sets out fuly the arguments
against such restrictions.
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Our present statute, unfortunately, does not prescribe a
method of converting a divorce from bed and board into an absolute divorce.47 This omission will give rise to numerous problems.48
Under the old law, it was provided that a bed and board divorce
could be converted into an absolute divorce in the same suit.4 9 As
no method is provided for under the present law, the courts will
perhaps require a new suit to be brought to convert the temporary
decree into an absolute divorce.5 0
The state's policy respecting divorce is not fundamentally
changed by the present revisions. While the grounds of divorce
have been enlarged and the bed and board divorce has been dispensed with, there is no attempt to commercialize our divorce
process. The suit for separate maintenance continues, permitting
the parties to separate and remain married. The residence requirements properly remain austere to the non-resident litigant."-HOUSTON A. Smi~rr.
47 The method of converting the bed and board divorce into an absolute
divorce was set out in the Code. W. VA. REv. CoDE (1931) c. 48, art. 2,
§ 20. Under the revision, section twenty of the Code is re-enacted and now
reads that the bed and board decree shall be made final "in the manner
prescribed by the code of West Virginia." No other section of the Code
or 4 the present revision prescribes such method.
8Judge Charles G. Baker of the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit has suggested the following problems relative to conversion: (1) If at the time
of the passage of the new act a suit was pending for a bed and board decree
on the ground of less than two year desertion, can the suit be converted
into one for final decree and the cause kept on the docket until a two-year
period of desertion has elapsed! (2) Where a suit is pending at the time
of the passage of the act and the bill prays for a bed and board decree
only, should the bill be amended either before or after conversion to pray
for final decree or can such a decree be entered under the prayer for general
relief? (3) Where a bill is pending prior to the passage of the act which
seeks a temporary decree on the ground of less than two years' desertion
and the plaintiff has proof of cruelty, can he file and amended bill, alleging
cruelty, prior to conversion and then have the case converted into one for
final decree, or can he ask to have the suit converted on his old bill and
after conversion file an amended bill showing the additional facts? (4)
Where there was, at the time of the passage of the act, a decree for bed
and board on the grounds of desertion and the desertion has continued for
less than two years at the time of the passage of the act, can the plaintiff
immediately get a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony or must
he wait until two years desertion has elapsed?
49 W. VA. REV. CoDE (1931) c. 48, art. 2, § 20.
ioWhile a new suit requires new process, this is a safe method of proceeding until the question is ruled on by the Supreme Court of Appeals.
See Dixon v. Dixon, 73 W. Va. 7, 79 S. E. 1016 (1913).
51W. VA. REv. CODE (1931) c. 48, art. 2 § 8. The plaintiff must be a
bona fide citizen and have resided in the state for at least one year immediately preceding the bringing of the suit.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1935

7

